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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT H. HINCKLEY, INC. 
a corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STATE TAX COMMISSION 
OF UTAH, 
Defendant, 
UTAH RETAIL MERCHANTS 
ASSOCIATION, 
A micus Curiae. 
Case No. 
10260 
BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE 
RELIEF SOUGHT AND STATEMENT 
OF FACTS 
The Utah Retail Merchants Association, a vol-
untary association of retail merchants doing busi-
ness within the confines of the State of Utah, has 
heretofore filed a petition for leave to file a brief 
amicus curiae, in which it has requested that it be 
permitted to appear and make oral argument in the 
above matter. 
On the 23rd day of September, 1965, by an 
order granting leave to appear as amicus curiae, 
signed by Chief Justice F. Henri Henriod, this re-
quest was granted. 
1 
This Honorable Court has heretofore made and 
entered its decision affirming the decision of the 
State Tax Commission sustaining assessments of 
sales and use tax deficiencies with respect to the 
sale of merchandise by vending machines. 
The Court, in the course of its decision, has 
made certain observations and statements which we 
would like to call to the Court's attention: 
* * * Nor has our attention been called to 
any provision of our Sales Tax Act which 
makes it unlawful or prohibits a vendor from 
absorbing or paying the tax himself, if he so 
chooses. It does not necessarily follow from 
the fact that the 1937 amendment deleted the 
provision that the vendor had the option of 
collecting from the vendee or absorbing the 
tax himself that the legislature intended to 
prohibit or make it unlawful for a vendor to 
absorb or pay the tax himself. The Act still 
provides that the tax shall be collected and 
that the vendor is responsible for its collec· 
tion * * * 
This portion of the decision has raised con· 
sternation and questions with respect to the inter· 
pretation of Section 59-15-5, Utah Code Annotated 
1953, as amended, as it pertains to the collection of 
the sales tax by the vendor; whether or not it is 
mandatory upon him to collect the same; and 
whether or not the 1937 amendment as referred to 
in the fore going quoted portion of the opinion, by 
substituting the word "shall" for the word "may", 
has no meaning or effect. 
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We do not believe that it is the Court's inten-
tion and desire to give no meaning to the substitu-
tion. 
The original statute pertaining to the subject 
matter referred to in the herein quoted decision ap-
pears in Chapter 20, Laws of Utah 1933, 2nd Spe-
cial Session, and provides as follows: 
Every person receiving any payment or con-
sideration upon a sale of property or service 
subject to the tax under the provisions of this 
act, or to whom such payment or considera-
tion is payable (hereinafter called the vendor) 
shall be responsible for the collection of the 
amount of the tax imposed on said sales and 
shall, * * * The vendor niay, if he sees fit, 
co?lect the tax froni the vendee, * * * 
It will be noted that the collection of the sales 
tax by the vendor was optional. 
This Honorable Court, in the case of W. F. 
Jensen Candy Co. v. State Tax Coniniission, 61 P2d 
629, in referring to this section made the follow-
ing statement: 
* * * The vendor has the option to collect the 
tax from the vendee; that is, he may, "if he 
sees fit," do so. He may say to the vendee, 
"The tax is so much. You may either pay it 
or 'no sale' ", or he may, if he sees fit, elect 
to pay or absorb the tax himself. * * * 
It is significant that immediately following this 
case the Legislature of the State of Utah saw fit 
to amend the section of the statute of the 1933 sec-
tion of the sales tax laws herein quoted. This was 
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done by the 1937 session of the Legislature, and is 
as follows: 
Sec. 59-15-5. 
* * * Every person receiving any payment or 
consideration upon a sale of property or ser-
vice subject to the tax under the provisions 
of this act, or to whom such payment or con-
sideration is payable (hereinafter called the 
vendor) shall be responsible for the collec-
tion of the amount of the tax imposed on said 
sale; provided however, that where any sale 
of tangible personal property is made by a 
wholesaler to a retailer, upon the representa-
tion by the said retailer that the said person-
al property is purchased by the said retailer 
for resale, and the said personal property 
thereafter is not resold, the wholesaler shall 
not be responsible for the collection or pay-
ment of the tax imposed on the said sale, but 
the said retailer shall be solely liable for the 
said tax. The vendor shall collect the tax from 
the vendee * * * ' 
ARGUMENT 
In view of the statements of the majority of 
this Honorable Court quoted herein, the question 
arises whether the 1937 amendment is just a play 
on words; that the Legislature, by substituting the 
word "shall" for the word '''may", had no purpose 
whatsoever in making such amendment. 
We, of course, do not believe that this Honor-
able Court intended either of the two constructions. 
This Honorable Court, in the case of Ralph 
Child Construction Company v. State Tax Commis-
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sion, 362 P2d 422, made the following statement 
with respect to the portion of the statute in ques-
tion: 
It is generally recognized that '·'courts will 
give an act such a construction as will ac-
complish" its purpose. The purpose of this 
act was to collect the sales tax from the per-
son liable to pay it without hardship or in-
justice. The retailer is required to collect the 
tax from the consumer and pay it to the Com-
mission as a matter of convenience. But the 
primary liability to pay the tax is placed on 
the consumer. * * * 
We feel that this Court in making the state-
rnen t "the retailer is required to collect the tax" 
should dispose of our fears in this matter. However, 
we would like to make some observations in regard 
to this matter. 
The law is fundamental that in every amend-
ment of a statute, the Legislature intended that it 
was made to effect some purpose. 
It cannot be presumed that it was coincidental 
that the Legislature amended the act after the 
Court's interpretation in the Jensen case, supra, 
where it said the collection was optional, to that of 
making it mandatory to collect it. 
Certainly the Legislature intended a change 
when it changed the statute from the option of the 
vendor to collect the tax - 1933 Act, that is, he 
vendor may, if he sees fit, collect the tax from the 
vendee, to the 1937 amendment, the vendor shall 
collect the tax from the vendee. 
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The general rule is that a change in phrase-
ology indicates persuasively, and raises a presump-
tion, that a departure from the old law was intend-
ed. It must be assumed that the Legislature had a 
reasonable motive. 
50 Am. Jur., Sec. 275, Page 261, and cases set 
forth therein. 
The amendment of an existing act indicates that 
a change was intended. 
Hopson v. North American Ins. Co. 233 P2d 
799. 
The presumption is that every amendment of 
the statute is made to effect some purpose, and ef· 
feet must be given the amended law in a manner 
consistent with the amendment. 
50 Am. Jur., Sec. 275, Page 262, and cases 
set for th therein. 
In enacting legislation upon a particular sub· 
ject, the law making body is presumed to be fami-
liar not only with its own prior legislation relating 
to the subject, but also with the co'urt decisions con-
struing such farmer legislation. 
In re Levy, 23 Wash. 2d 607, 161 P2d, 651 
ALR 805. 
It would seem that there is no other conclusion 
than that the Legislature, by amending the statute 
immediately after the Jensen case, supra, in the 
particular which has been emphasized herein, that 
it had the Jensen case in mind when it made the 
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substitution of the word "shall", which we feel is 
mandatory, to the option of collecting the sales tax. 
This is certainly a reasonable and proper assump-
tion to be made under the facts in this case. 
The Utah statute in question is very compar-
able to that of the State of Washington. We feel 
that the case of Morrow vs. Henneford, 47 P2d 1019, 
is very pertinent to the question involved herein: 
Section 21 of the act provides that the tax 
imposed under title 3 shall be paid by the 
buyer to the seller, and it is made a duty of 
the seller to collect from the buyer the full 
amount of the tax payable in respect of each 
sale, and in case any seller fails to collect the 
tax, he is primarily liable to the state for the 
amount. 
The appellant objects to this provision as im-
posing the burden of an uncompensated ser-
vice upon him. This provision, as we view it, 
is an administrative detail, since the consumer 
always ultimately pays. It is the evident pur-
pose of the law to make for honest dealing by 
having the purchaser pay the tax in the first 
instance, so that no opportunity is offered the 
seller to increase the price to the consumer 
beyond the definite amount of the tax. 
There is some fear under the interpretation of 
the decision in this cause that the door is open for 
a vendor to absorb or pay the tax, as he chooses. 
This of course would be contrary to the interpreta-
' ' tion of most merchants to the effect that the vendor 
shall collect the tax. 
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If a merchant takes the position that he can 
absorb the tax or pay it, as he chooses, he, of course
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uses certain advertising gimmicks, such as that the 
consumer or purchaser does not have to pay a sales 
tax when doing business with him, or that there 
is no sales tax at his establishment. This, of course, 
opens the door to the purchasing public getting hurt. 
Sales tax en large equipment or automobiles amounts 
to a substantial sum. 
If the purchaser relies upon the merchant that 
there is no tax, or that the merchant will absorb 
it or pay it, and the merchant does not do so, the 
purchaser, of course, is then liable in accordance 
with Utah law. 
As this Honorable Court stated in the Chi/cl 
case, supra, where the retailer fails to collect the 
tax, the Commission could assess the tax against 
the ultimate consumer or purchaser and collect the 
same from him. 
The act in question here is not the only time 
that the Legislature has seen fit to have the pur-
chasing public appraised of a tax. For illustration, 
in Section 15-l-2a, Utah Code Annotated 1953, en-
titled "Conditional sale of tangible personal prop· 
erty not to exceed $7500 cash price", the Legis-
lature of the State of Utah, in addition to compel-
ling the seller to set forth the amounts to be paid 
to any public officer as fees in connection with the 
sales transaction, requires that the seller must set 
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forth in great detail the various items making up 
the purchase price of the article sold. 
This type of legislation is becoming more pre-
valent in the various states of the Union as a pro-
tection to the purchasing public. It seems to us that 
the statute is very clear, that it is mandatory upon 
the vendor, to collect the tax. That the Legislature 
without question had a purpose and motive in sub-
stituting the word "shall" for the previous option 
of collecting the tax, as provided in the 1933 Ses-
sion Laws. 
Such an amendment that the Legislatur made 
in 1937 was a progressive one and one aimed at 
protecting the purchasing public. 
It was, also, of course one to assist the Tax 
Commission in its auditing procedures with the 
\'end ors. 
There is no question as to the right of the 
Legislature to make it a condition of selling an 
article, for the vendor to collect the tax imposed on 
the transaction. 
Certainly the Legislature had a purpose and 
motive in doing this, particularly when we realize 
that it was done immediately after the Jensen case, 
supra. 
It must be remembered that in Utah, if the 
l'etailer fails to collect the tax or to report the sale, 
or if he should go into bankruptcy, go out of busi-
ness or become insolvent, then, because this is a 
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tax on the consumer, the consumer is liable there-
for. 
If -the vendor may absorb or pay the tax him-
self, and so advises the consumer, and does not pay 
it, then is not the consumer still liable? Where a 
vendor may advertise that he will absorb the tax 
or that in his place of business there is no tax to be 
paid, and then he does not pay the tax, the con-
sumer must pay it. 
Does this not open the door to loose practices 
that the Legislature intended to correct by the 1937 
amendment? If the door is open to such practices, 
the purchasing public can be hurt. 
Where a vendor is required to collect the tax 
and the vendee or purchaser knows that, and the 
sales tax is a part of the purchase price and he so 
pays it, then there is no chance of damage to him. 
Statutory construction compels the giving of 
the amendment a purpose and an effect. This can-
not be disregarded. 
CONCLUSION 
We sincerely feel that the majority of the Court, 
by its decision, did not intend to disregard the sub-
stitution of the word "shall" for the option of col-
lecting the tax and imply that there was no differ-
ence. 
We feel that in the absence of a clarification 
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of the Court in this decision, that some confusion 
may exist among the selling public. That is, that 
a merchant is not required to collect the sales tax, 
but that he may absorb or pay it himself, as was his 
privilege prior to the 1937 amendment. 
We sincerely trust that this Honorable Court 
will see its way clear to amend its decision in such 
a way as to dispel any confusion or question as to 
whether or not the vendor is relieved from his obliga-
tion to collect the tax, and that he may not absorb 
it or pay it himself and thereby defeat the purpose 
of the act, namely, to collect it, so that the purposes 
of the act as intended by the Legislature may be 
fulfilled. 
Respectfully submitted, 
LOUIS H. CALLISTER, SR. 
LOUIS H. CALLISTER, JR. 
Attorneys for Utah Retail 
Merchants Association, 
A miciis Curiae 
800 Kennecott Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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